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POOF, UP IN SMOKE! THE COAL INDUSTRY GETS BURNED:
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT INCINERATES STATE AUTONOMY
WITH ITS STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IN
ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN COAL v MILLER
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) forced coal-dependent, electric-generating plants through-
out the country to comply with strict standards in order to reduce
sulfur dioxide emissions and acid rain.' In an effort to comply with
the CAA, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Coal Act.2
Under the Coal Act, Illinois utility companies can still meet the
United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) CAA stan-
dards while continuing to use Illinois coal by installing scrubbers at
electric generating plants.3
In Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller,4 the plaintiff, Alliance for
Clean Coal (Alliance), claimed that the Coal Act violated the Com-
1. See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1995) ("In
1990 Congress once again amended the [Clean Air] Act, this time requiring a
drastic two-stage reduction in industrial sulfur dioxide emissions in an attempt to
combat acid rain"). See generally Pub. L. No. 101-549, 1990 Stat. 1630 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1970) (amended 1990)); Id. § 7411 (estab-
lishing standards of performance for new stationary sources); Id. §§ 7651-7651 (o)
(establishing standards to control acid deposition).
2. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593 (stating passage of Coal Act was in furtherance of
1990 CAA Amendments). The Illinois state legislature realized that low-sulfur
western coal offered a cheaper, more "viable" alternative to the high-sulfur Illinois
coal that requires expensive, new scrubbers for sulfur dioxide control. Id. The
Coal Act is codified in part at 220 ILL. ComP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-402.1, 5/8-508
(West 1995).
3. See Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594 (describing utilities' methods to comply with
CAA under Coal Act). The CAA promotes the use of scrubbers as a feasible way of
burning Illinois coal. Id. This combination provides a "cost-effective means of
compliance" with the CAA in comparison to the effect that changing fuel sources
and displacing Illinois coal would have on personal income. Id. See also 220 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1 (presenting methods of compliance with CAA). In
addition, the cost of the scrubbers can be passed on to customers in the utility
companies' rate base so that the companies will not incur additional expense for
having to comply with the CAA in this way. See Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594 (describing
Coal Act's subsidy provisions); see also 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1 (al-
lowing for cost of pollution control devices to fall on electricity consumers).
4. Alliance is a Virginia trade association composed of Colorado and Oregon
coal companies and three railroads that transport western coal. Alliance, 44 F.3d at
592.
(259)
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merce Clause of the United States Constitution. 5 Although the
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce
Clause as limiting the states' power to enact legislation that would
interfere with the free flow of interstate commerce. 6 This limiting
interpretation, commonly referred to as the dormant Commerce
Clause, was the basis of Alliance's constitutional challenge to the
Coal Act.7
The United States Supreme Court has developed two tests for
determining the constitutionality of state legislation challenged
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 8 Under the first test, the
stricter of the two, a statute violates the Commerce Clause when it
discriminates against interstate commerce on its face or in its practi-
cal effect.9 Under the second test, however, state regulations that
incidentally burden interstate commerce will be found unconstitu-
tional only if the burdens are "clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits" of the regulation. 10
In Alliance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit applied the stricter standard, holding that because imple-
mentation of the Coal Act adversly affected western coal compa-
5. Id. at 591 (stating Alliance alleged that Coal Act violated dormant Com-
merce Clause).
6. Id. at 595 (citing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992)). For a discussion of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, see infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
7. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 592. Discussing the nature of the dormant Commerce
Clause, the district court in Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554
(N.D. Ill. 1993), stated: "[a]lthough the commerce clause does not expressly ad-
dress the power of the states to regulate commerce within their borders, the
Supreme Court has long held that the 'negative' or 'dormant' commerce clause
prohibits the states from restricting or burdening interstate commerce." Id. (citing
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 530 U.S. 299, 313 (1852); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326
(1979)).
8. See generally City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1979) (stating per se
rule of invalidity under dormant Commerce Clause); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970) (adopting balancing test for analyzing dormant Commerce
Clause challenges). For a discussion of City of Philadelphia, see infra notes 51-53
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Pike, see infra notes 69-71 and accom-
panying text.
9. City of Phila., 457 U.S. at 624. See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138
(1985) (explaining holding in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), by
discussing strict scrutiny standard for dormant Commerce Clause challenges). For
further discussion of the strict scrutiny test, see infra notes 51-67 and accompany-
ing text.
10. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the balancing approach to dormant Commerce Clause cases.
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nies, it was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.11
Consequently, the court stripped Illinois of its power to regulate
and preserve its coal industry.12
This Note discusses the courts' interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause as it relates to state legislation which seeks to preserve
the viability of a state's environmental resources. Part II of this
Note describes the courts' approaches to state regulations chal-
lenged under the dormant Commerce Clause as well as the facts of
Alliance.13 Part III explicates the Seventh Circuit's finding that the
Illinois Coal Act places an unconstitutional burden on interstate
coal commerce. 14 Subsequently, Part IV analyzes the damaging im-
pact of the court's holding in limiting a state's autonomy and its
ability to preserve a valuable state industry.1 5 Part V concludes that
the Alliance court's decision adversly limits state sovereignty as well
as its ability to preserve the viability of its environmental
resources. 16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Seeking Cleaner Air
Coal is the most important natural resource for producing
electricity in the United States. 17 Yet, not all coal is considered
equal.18 The nation's coal reserves located west of the Mississippi,
lying in the Plains and Rocky Mountain regions, contain mostly low-
11. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594-97 (7th Cir. 1995) (using strict standard formu-
lated in City of Philadelphia to analyze Alliance's claims). The Seventh Circuit stated
that "[t]he obvious intent was to eliminate western coal use by Illinois generating
plants, thus effectively discriminating against western coal." Id. at 596. This dis-
criminatory state action is forbidden under the Commerce Clause. Id.
12. For a discussion of how the Seventh Circuit's decision interferes with state
-autonomy, see infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of Alliance's facts and procedural history, see infra notes
82-89 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's treatment of state
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause, see infra notes 45-81 and ac-
companying text.
14. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation and invalidation of
the Illinois Coal Act under the dormant Commerce Clause, see infra notes 90-160
and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the impact which the Seventh Circuit's decision will
have on state autonomy and a state's ability to exploit its valuable natural re-
sources, see infira notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of how the Alliance decision adversely limits state sover-
eignty and consequently, a state's ability to preserve the viability of its environmen-
tal resources, see infra text following note 172.
17. Allianc4 44 F.3d at 593. Electric companies burned 78% of the 998 mil-
lion tons of coal mined in 1992. Id.
18. Id. Coal contains different amounts of sulfur. The sulfur content varies
according to geographical location. Id.
1997]
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sulfur coal, while the reserves located east of the Mississippi, lying in
the Illinois Basin and Appalachians, contain higher proportions of
sulfur.19 Because sulfur dioxide is a primary air pollutant, monitor-
ing the levels of these chemicals is critical to protecting the
environment.2 0
When Congress amended the CAA in 1970, it gave EPA the
power to establish standards for regulating hazardous emissions
such as sulfur dioxide.21 In 1990, Congress once again amended
19. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981).
These differences are significant, because burning coal produces sulfur dioxide
that is proportional to the amount of sulfur contained in the coal. Miller, 44 F.3d
at 593 (citing Ackerman, supra).
20. See Ackerman, supra note 19, at 60-65. As gleaned from the language of
CAA Section 108, a "primary" pollutant is one which "may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare." CAA § 108, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7408(a) (1) (A). Ackerman notes that over time, sulfur dioxide may be trans-
formed into harmful sulfates, including sulfuric acid which can then be absorbed
into human lung tissue. Ackerman, supra note 19, at 62. In addition, sulfur diox-
ide can be transformed in the atmosphere, returning to the earth in the form of
acid rain which damages lakes, forests and buildings in addition to reducing visibil-
ity. Acid Rain Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 12529 (1991). According to EPA's notice
on Acid Rain Provisions, approximately 20 million tons of sulfur dioxide are emit-
ted by electric generating plants every year. Id. See also Russell Korobkin, The Local
Politics of Acid Rain: Public Versus Private Decisionmaking and the Dormant Commerce
Clause in a New Era of Environmental Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 689 (May 1995) [hereinaf-
ter Local Politics] (discussing sulfur dioxide emissions and CAA Amendments).
21. CAA § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a). This subsection reads: "The Administra-
tor is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his
functions under this chapter. The Administrator may delegate to any officer or
employee of the Environmental Protection Agency such of his powers and duties
under this chapter .... ." Id. Subsections 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(b) (1) (A) and
7411(b) (1) (B) provide that "[t]he Administrator shall ... publish proposed regu-
lations, establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources .... He
shall include a category of sources in [his list] if in his judgment it causes, or
contributes significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." Id. As of 1970, the six pollutants for which
EPA had established air quality standards were ozone, lead, sulfur dioxide, particu-
lates, nitrogen and carbon monoxide. S. REP. No. 101-228, (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3391.
The 1970 Amendments established a partnership between state and federal
governments. S. RP. No. 101-228, at 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3395.
Under the CAA, EPA establishes criteria for nationwide air quality standards while
the states develop implementation plans "to achieve and maintain the required
level of air quality." Id. The primary goal of the CAA is to "protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population." CAA § 101, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401. Additionally, Congress found that "air pollution prevention . .. and air
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local gov-
ernments." Id. Under the CAA, the EPA Administrator has a duty to encourage
cooperation among the states and local governments in air pollution prevention
and control activities in addition to promoting the enactment of uniform state and
local laws relating to air pollution control and prevention. CAA § 102, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7402.
4
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the CAA, instituting a "market-driven approach to emissions regula-
tion and allowing for the free transfer of emission 'allowances."' 22
This system was intended to promote efficiency while combatting
the ensuing sulfur dioxide and acid rain hazards.23
22. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1995). See also
CAA § 403, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (explaining allocations of annual allowances for
existing and new generating units); Acid Rain Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 12,530
(describing market approach by which allowances are transferrable and market
forces control their use).
By 1990, the CAA had been amended twice, each time establishing more strin-
gent emission standards in an effort to eradicate the elusive sulfur dioxide prob-
lem. See Pub. L. No. 101-549, 1990 Stat. 1630 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411 (1990)) (establishing standards of performance for sources). In 1970, EPA
proposed that sulfur dioxide could be controlled by the use of low-sulfur coal or
the use of pollution control devices ("scrubbers"). Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593. In
1977, Congress amended the Act so that new facilities no longer had the afore-
mentioned options for compliance. Id. Rather, new generating plants were re-
quired to install pollution control devices. Id.
The 1990 CAA Amendments purport to permanently reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions by 10 million tons or, in other words, cut the annual sulfur dioxide emis-
sions of electric utilities in half. Acid Rain Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 12,530. The
1990 plan is implemented in two phases. Id. Phase I runs from 1995 to 2000 while
Phase II begins in the year 2000 and affects most utilities that emit sulfur dioxide.
Id. In order to comply with the CAA, utilities must limit their sulfur dioxide emis-
sions to levels specified in the CAA and may not emit more of the pollutant than
they hold in allowance. Id.
An allowance under the CAA is a "limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide
in accordance with the provisions" of CAA Title IV. CAA § 403, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651(b). Under section 403, the Administrator shall allocate annual allowances
for each generating unit in an amount equal to the annual emission limitations as
calculated within the subchapter and other sections of the CAA. Id. Section 403
also provides that the Administrator shall not, however, allocate allowances to emit
sulfur dioxide beginning January 1, 2000, that would result in emissions in excess
of 8.9 million tons. Id. In determining the emission limitations, EPA considers
such factors as "the nature and severity of the health effects involved, the size of
the sensitive population(s) at risk, and the kind and degree of the uncertainties
that must be addressed." National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Diox-
ides (Sulfur Dioxide)-Reproposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,958, 58,959 (1994).
Once allowances have been allocated, they may be transferred among the
owners or operators of affected sources. CAA § 403, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b). Addi-
tionally, the Administrator is also responsible for promulgating a system for issuing
and tracking allowances and specifying the procedures and requirements "for an
orderly and competitive functioning of the allowance system." Id. The transfera-
bility of allowances thus permits "market forces to govern their ultimate use." Acid
Rain Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 12,530.
23. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593. See also CAA § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (stating Con-
gress' findings and purposes of 1990 amendments). Among Congress' findings
were:
(1) the presence of acidic compounds and their precursors in the atmos-
phere and in deposition from the atmosphere represents a threat to
natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public health;
[and]
(2) the principal sources of the acidic compounds and their precursors
in the atmosphere are emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from
the combustion of fossil fuels...
1997]
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The compliance options which EPA offered enhanced the via-
bility of western coal, because the use of low-sulfur coal would likely
be less expensive than other options.2 4 The 1990 amendments,
however, were potentially harmful to certain regions such as the
Illinois Basin which produces high-sulfur coal.25 The Illinois Gen-
Id.
Pursuant to the 1990 amendments, generating plants had at least four ways to
comply: 1) installing new scrubbers, 2) using low-sulfur coal, 3) using an alterna-
tive fuel source, or 4) buying emission allowances. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593. See
generally CAA §§ 401-416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(o) (describing compliance re-
quirements and options for sources to control acid deposition). The primary pur-
pose of Title IV of the CAA as stated in section 401 is "to reduce the adverse effects
of acid deposition through reductions in annual emissions of sulfur dioxide" and
"to encourage energy conservation, use of renewable and clean alternative tech-
nologies, and pollution prevention as a long-range strategy . . ." Id. § 401, 42
U.S.C. § 7651. According to environmental studies, the implementation of such
sulfur dioxide air quality standards as those in the CAA have resulted in substantial
improvements in air quality including a downward trend in the amount of sulfur
dioxide in the air over the decade from 1983 to 1992. National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur dioxide)-Reproposal, 59 Fed. Reg. at
58,960. For example, in that decade the presence of sulfur dioxide in the air
dropped 23 percent. Id.
24. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593. Burning western, low-sulfur coal once again be-
came less expensive than installing new scrubbers to burn high-sulfur coal. Id.
According to a Senate report, "[o ] ne simple method of reducing SO(2) emissions
is . . . to use lower sulfur coal." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 292, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA..N. at 3675. However, the Senate report also notes that the switching of
fuel in the East is "impracticable" and that "[l] arge-scale fuel switching would also
impact unfavorably on the eastern high-sulfur coal industry." Id. On the other
hand, coal washing ("scrubbing") is most economical with high-sulfur coal, though
this process only achieves moderate results. Id. Coal washing removes the pyritic
sulfur found in coal by crushing the coal and physically separating the particles
based on their gravity in water. Id. Thus, the Senate report recognized the eastern
coal industry's need to minimize costs when attempting to achieve higher air qual-
ity standards. See id. at 303, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3682.
25. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593 (citing Ackerman, supra note 19). The amount of
sulfur-dioxide that coal emits is proportional to the amount of sulfur it contains.
Id. Coal mined in the Illinois Basin, an area which includes most of Illinois and
parts of Indiana and western Kentucky, is relatively high in sulfur. Id. By compari-
son, coal mined west of the Rocky Mountains is very low in sulfur. Id.
See also Russell Korobkin, Sulfur Dioxide and the Constitution: Legal Doctrine and
Responses to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 13 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 349 (1994)
[hereinafter Sulfur Dioxide]. This commentator notes that "a mass substitution of
low-sulfur coal.. . could cause the loss of thousands ofjobs." Id. at 357. Korobkin
also states that the Illinois legislature, when determining what would be the lowest
cost solution for complying with the CAA amendments, considered the broader
social costs that would result from a switch from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur west-
ern coal. Id. at 367. These costs include increases in unemployment claims, de-
creases in tax revenues and psychological harm to displaced workers. Id. at 367
n.98. According to one legislative report, the legislators were forced to decide
between dealing with unemployment costs of $36 million within three months or
spreading the same cost for coal cleaning techniques over twenty years. Id. at 368.
The legislative history of the CAA reveals that Congress recognized that pro-
ducers of high-sulfur coal would be at a disadvantage as a result of the Amend-
ments for it noted that the sulfur dioxide could "be reduced sharply and
6
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eral Assembly recognized the potential damage that the 1990
amendments would cause the Illinois coal industry if it were forced
to install costly scrubbers in order to meet the CAA's require-
ments.2 6 In response to this concern, the legislature enacted the
Illinois Coal Act (Coal Act).27
economically with existing technologies and practices." S. REP. No. 101-228, at
291, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674. The Senate believed that the transfera-
bility of allowances between units is the "compliance linchpin" for sources that
must comply with the 1990 standards and that the flexibility of Title IV of the CAA
allows for coal users to choose the means for complying with the emissions require-
ments. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 315-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3698-99.
Furthermore, Title IV's flexibility, especially the allowance transfer provisions, re-
sults in significant cost-reductions. Id. Indeed, the Amendments specifically state
that nothing precludes states from offering incentives to utilities. Korobkin, supra,
at 369 (citing CAA § 404(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7561c(f)(3)). Had Congress intended
to restrict the techniques that states could use for reducing sulfur dioxide emis-
sions, it would have explicitly stated the restriction in the Amendments. Id. at 369.
Therefore, it appears that Congress wanted to ensure that even those regions that
produce high-sulfur coal could still subsist while complying with the 1990 stan-
dards. Id.
26. See Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593 (stating that only way Illinois high-sulfur coal
could continue to be burned was in conjunction with expensive new scrubbers).
According to the Illinois State Department of Energy and Natural Resources, a
"nationwide shift away from high-sulfur coal could cost Illinois 17,000 non-mining
jobs as well as 3500 mining jobs by the year 2000." Korobkin, Local Politics, supra
note 20, at 702 (citing Rick Person, State Seen Losing 20,500 Coal Related Jobs by 2000,
CM. TRJB., Apr. 13, 1993, § 2, at 4). For a full discussion of the way in which high-
sulfur coal users can comply with the CAA, see supra notes 24-25.
27. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593. See generally 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-
402.1, 5/8-508 (West 1995) (Illinois Coal Act compliance plans). These provisions
are additions to the Illinois Utility Act. Miller, 44 F.3d at 593; 220 ILL. CoMp. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5/8-402.1, 5/8-508.
The Coal Act was Illinois' implementation plan to meet the 1990 Clean Air
Act standards. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/8-402.1. CAA section 107 provides
that
[e]ach State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality
within the entire geographic area comprising such State by submitting an
implementation plan for such State which will specify the manner in
which national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards will
be achieved and maintained within each air quality control region in
such State.
CAA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7407. Furthermore, CAA section 110 requires that each
state's implementation plan shall be adopted by the state after notice and public
hearing and shall include enforceable emission limitations and other control
measures, means, or techniques (including economic incentives such as fees, marketable
permits, and auctions of emissions rights), as well as schedules and timetables for com-
pliance, as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of
this chapter. CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (emphasis added). The compliance
plans are binding commitments to meet emission reduction requirements in a
timely manner. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 333-34, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3716-17. Section 108 of the CAA, a new 1990 addition, specifies the compliance
plan requirements; however, the compliance plans are to give owners and opera-
tors "sufficient time to explore and exploit the widest variety of compliance op-
tions." Id.
1997]
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The Coal Act requires both utility companies and the Utility
Commission, which approves or rejects CAA compliance plans, to
take into account "the need to maintain and preserve as a valuable
State resource the mining of coal in Illinois."2 8 Furthermore, the
Coal Act allows generating plants to subsidize the cost of installing
new scrubbers by increasing their customers' base rates. 29 Essen-
The Coal Act "does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
purposes of the federal law." Korobkin, Sulfur Dioxide, supra note 25, at 369.
Rather, Illinois' compliance plan was among the first to be promulgated and was
the first to mandate a specific compliance option. Korobkin, Local Politics, supra
note 20, at 697. The Coal Act requires the state's four largest electric utility plants
to comply with the 1990 CAA Amendments by installing scrubbers. Id. (citing 220
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1 (a)).
First, the Coal Act requires all public utilities to file compliance plans with the
Illinois Commerce Commission. Id. Second, the Coal Act requires those utilities
that use Illinois coal as their primary fuel source to include pollution control de-
vices in their compliance plans. Id. Only two generating plants, Illinois Power's
Baldwin plant and Commonwealth Edison's Kincaid plant fall within the strictures
of the second requirement. Id. According to Korobkin, "[t]echnically, all that is
required from [those plants other than the named two] is that they consider com-
pliance options other than fuel switching; they need not adopt those other strate-
gies." Id. For the textual language and a discussion of the Coal Act provisions, see
infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
28. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-402.1(a). The statute provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) The General Assembly finds that (i) the health, welfare and prosper-
ity of all Illinois citizens require that Illinois electric utilities, in complying
with the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
and that the Illinois Commerce Commission, in reviewing and approving
the plans of such utilities for compliance, take into account the need for
utilities to. . . use coal mined in Illinois in an environmentally responsi-
ble manner in the production of electricity, and the need to maintain
and preserve as a valuable State resource the mining of coal in Illinois,
and that(ii) the construction of pollution control devices for the control
of sulfur dioxide emissions.. .burning Illinois coal as a fuel source can be
an environmentally responsible and cost effective means of compliance
when the impact on personal income in this State of changing the fuel
used at such generating units so as to displace coal mined in Illinois is
taken into account.. . and that the owner of such generating units should
be allowed to recover through rates their prudent costs incurred in de-
signing, acquiring, constructing, installing and testing such facilities ....
Id.
Furthermore, this section of the Coal Act requires that any public utility own-
ing a coal-fired electric generating plant "shall include in its proposed CAA com-
pliance plan the installation of pollution control devices" for sulfur dioxide
pollution control "to enable them to continue to burn Illinois coal." Id. This com-
pliance plan design adheres to Congress' devotion to flexibility in meeting the
CAA requirements and its recognition of the need to allow eastern states' sources
to continue to burn high-sulfur coal while attaining the 1990 standards. See supra
note 24.
29. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-402.1(e). This section provides that:
the utility shall be entitled to recover its prudent costs upon the provision
of such service on a consistent and sustainable basis. Any increase in
rates attributable to inclusion in rate base of a public utility's prudent
investment in the costs associated with such facilities, or the recovery of
8
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tially, this provision enables utility companies to continue their use
of Illinois coal while complying with the stringent requirements of
the CAA.30 Additionally, the Coal Act requires public utilities to
submit requests for "modification [s]" of fuel use to the Utility Com-
mission.31 "Modification" is defined as any change in fuel source
that would result in the decreased use of Illinois coal by ten percent
or more.3 2 However, the Coal Act does not specify that every pro-
posed reduction in consumption of Illinois coal will be refused,
rather, it requires the Utility Commission to consider various fac-
tors before it can grant or deny a modification request.3 3
B. Demonstrating Standing to Pursue a Constitutional
Challenge
In order to bring a claim under the United States Constitution,
Article III requires claimants to first demonstrate they have suf-
fered an "injury in fact."3 4 An injury in fact is "an invasion of a
prudent costs pursuant to the use of a service contract, shall be allocated
among its principal customer rate classifications on the basis of costs of
services to such classifications.
Id. This provision coincides with Congress' intent to allow states to include eco-
nomic incentives in their sulfur dioxide control plans. See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410; supra notes 21-22.
Additionally, Illinois Code section 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-220 more
specifically deals with a utility company's ability to increase the base rates of its
customers to compensate for the cost of installing scrubbers. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/9-220. This section states that the Commission may authorize the in-
crease of rates based upon a change in the cost of fuel which includes "any fees
paid by the utility for the implementation and operation of a process for... desul-
furization" under CAA requirements. Id. In addition, this section provides that
the Commission may also authorize the increase or decrease of rates based on
expenditures or revenues arising from the sale or purchase of emission allowances
under the 1990 CAA Amendments. Id. Furthermore, the Coal Act also authorizes
a direct subsidy of $35 million to the operators of the Baldwin plant to offset the
cost of installing scrubbers. Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note 20, at 700-01.
30. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1(a). For the textual language of
this requirement, see supra note 28.
31. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-508.
32. Id.
33. Id. Section 5/8-508 provides that upon request for modification, the
Commission shall conduct a public hearing and shall accept comments from inter-
ested parties who have qualified evidence pertaining to the increased cost or sav-
ings of the proposed modification or of alternative actions. Id. Indeed, the
Commission "shall attach primary weight to the cost or cost savings to the custom-
ers of the utility." Id. If the Commission grants approval of a proposed modifica-
tion, it may also impose such requirements as are necessary to protect the public
interest. Id.
34. Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 470 F. Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Under
Article III of the Constitution, federal court jurisdiction may only be triggered
when there is a "case or controversy." U.S. CONST. art. III. For a full discussion of
Mapco's facts and the court's holding, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. See
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legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' 3 5
Second, the claimant must establish a causal connection between
the alleged constitutional violation and the injury.3 6 Finally, it
must be likely that the court's decision can compensate for the
injury.3 7
In Mapco v. Grunder,38 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio articulated the requirement that a plain-
tiff must demonstrate the existence of an injury in fact in order to
satisfy the requirements for standing. The court held that the
plaintiff successfully demonstrated an injury in fact, because the tax
statute at issue "operate[d] directly upon the use of Mapco's prod-
uct-low-sulfur coal."3 9 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,40 stated that the issue of standing
strongly depends "upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of
the action ... at issue."4 1 The Lujan Court rejected the plaintiffs'
also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (holding that in equal protection cases, denial of right to
compete on equal footing constitutes injury in fact).
35. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Whit-
more v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 n.16 (1972)).
For a discussion of the Court's holding in Lujan, see infra notes 41-43 and accom-
panying text.
36. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The Lujan court noted that the injury must be
"fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant .. " Id. (quoting
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
37. Id. at 561. The Court stated that the proposed remedy must "likely" cure
the injury as opposed to being "speculative." Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38,
43).
38. Mapco, 470 F. Supp. at 402.
39. Id. at 404. The plaintiff in Mapco challenged a tax imposed on the stor-
age, use or other consumption of coal. Id. at 402-03. The rate of the tax de-
pended on the sulfur content of the consumer's coal, a higher tax being assessed
to coal with a low-sulfur concentration. Id. For example, the tax per ton for coal
that contained less than .5% sulfur was 40 cents while the tax on coal that con-
tained 1.5% of sulfur or more was only 15 cents. Id. The court noted that
although Mapco could not show any actual diminution in sales, a direct tax upon a
product effectively inhibits commerce. Id. at 404.
40. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
41. Id. at 561. The Lujan Court considered the issue of whether a plaintiff
could have standing if the challenged statute regulated someone other than the
plaintiff. Id. at 562. The Court noted that "when the plaintiff is not himself the
object of the government action he challenges, standing is not precluded, but is
ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
44-45 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)). In Lujan, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act which was
amended to limit environmental protection plans to the United States and the
10
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claim, because they failed to show that they were personally injured
by the legislative amendments. 42 The Court stated that in order to
challenge a statute's constitutionality, plaintiffs need to submit evi-
dence and specific facts which show that the statute directly affects
them.43 Thus, the test for standing requires that claimants demon-
strate a particular and direct injury to their own interests.44
1. The Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution
confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the
several states.45 Although the clause provides Congress with an af-
firmative grant of power, it has also been interpreted as having a
negative component. 46 The term "dormant Commerce Clause"
stems from this negative interpretation, as the clause limits the
states' ability to regulate interstate commerce even when Congress
has not enacted any legislation. 47 This reading of the Commerce
high seas, excluding from its coverage actions in foreign countries. Id. at 555.
Defenders of Wildlife objected to the diminished geographic scope of the amend-
ments, alleging that funded projects abroad threatened certain species. Id.
42. Id. at 556. The Court declared that "the 'injury in fact' test requires more
than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured." Id. at 563 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734-35 (1972)).
43. Id. The Court stated that the Defenders needed to show specific facts that
endangered species abroad were being threatened by the funded projects in addi-
tion to showing that their members were directly affected apart from their interest
in the subject. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm., 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977)). Because the plaintiffs failed to present such evidence, they did
not establish a causal connection between the government's regulation and their
"injury" in addition to not fulfilling the third prong of the test. Id. at 563. There-
fore, the Defenders did not demonstrate standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the amendments. Id. at 562.
44. For a full discussion of the applicable test for standing, see supra notes 34-
43 and accompanying text.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. ("Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce .. . among the several States .... ).
46. David M. Levy, Note, Federalism and the Environment: National Solid Waste
Management v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 12 WHr-nER L.
REv. 635 (1991). Levy argues that the Commerce Clause has two aspects: one that
grants unlimited power to Congress and another, the negative side, which is effec-
tuated without congressional action and which limits state power. Id. See also D.
Lee Shields, Note, Maine v. Taylor Natural Resource Statutes Against the Commerce
Clause or When Is a Hughes Not a Hughes But a Pike?, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291
(discussing Commerce Clause restraints on state control of natural resources).
47. See Levy, supra note 46, at 636. Because the clause can be activated with-
out congressional action, dormant Commerce Clause analyses revolve around the
extent to which the clause limits state legislative action and the justifications that
states must provide to sustain a challenge under the clause. See City of Phila. v.
NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The Court in City of Philadelphia stated that opin-
ions of the Court "have reflected an alertness to the evils of 'economic isolation'
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Clause denies the states' ability to enact legislation that would in-
hibit the free flow of interstate commerce. 48 Therefore, judicial de-
bate evolving out of the interpretation of the dormant Commerce
Clause revolves around the types of state legislation that may or may
not actually "interfere" with interstate commerce. 49
2. Legitimate State Interests v. Interstate Commerce
Courts have taken several different approaches to the issue of
state regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause. 50 Pursuant
to the test formulated by the United States Supreme Court in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey,51 a court must first decide whether the
challenged statute is a protectionist measure or whether it is di-
rected at legitimate local concerns. 52 In discerning the statute's
and protectionism, while at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on
interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the
health and safety of its people." Id. at 623-24. See also DeHart v. Austin, 39 F.3d
718, 723 (1994) (finding local ordinance which regulates legitimate local interest
shall be upheld unless burden on interstate commerce is excessive in relation to
local benefit).
48. Shields, supra note 46, at 292 (stating "[t]he Commerce Clause fosters
efficient use of resources by encouraging the free flow of goods across state lines,
and by prohibiting states from engaging in economic protectionism."). But see
George P. Patterson, Note, Does the Commerce Clause Value Public Goods?: West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, 44 CATH. U.L. REv. 977, 979 (1994-95) (asserting dormant Com-
merce Clause "generates tension between the text of the Constitution, notions of
federalism, and the efficient maintenance of the economic union" as well as vio-
lates principles of federalism and separation of powers).
49. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (finding state regula-
tion of natural resources serves legitimate local purpose which cannot be served by
available nondiscriminatory means); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36
(1980) (holding "'States retain authority under their general police powers to reg-
ulate matters of legitimate local concern'"); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979) (discussing differences between state legislation that discriminates and that
which furthers legitimate local purpose). Another facet of the judicial debate in-
volves whether the judiciary should involve itself in analyses of the dormant Com-
merce Clause at all. See also Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce
Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. Rxv. 1215, 1243 (1994) (stating formulation of
dormant Commerce Clause analyses should be role of legislature, not of courts).
50. See Levy, supra note 46, at 635 (discussing Supreme Court's evolving ap-
proaches to Dormant Commerce Clause cases). See also Lisa J. Petricone, Com-
ment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Sensible Standard of Review, 27 SANTA CiARA L.
.Ev. 443 (1987) (suggesting lower courts lack clear doctrine upon which to judge
dormant Commerce Clause cases as result of Supreme Court's failure to establish
"bright-line" standard).
51. 437 U.S. 617 (1979).
52. Id. at 624. The Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia considered New
Jersey's proposed prohibition of solid waste importation into the state. Id. at 618.
While NewJersey contended that the legislation was intended to further legitimate
local concerns over the health of its residents, Philadelphia and New Jersey landfill
owners argued that the prohibition amounted to an economic protectionist mea-
sure. Id. at 625. The City of Philadelphia Court stated that determining whether the
12
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purposes, courts consider the legislative intent as well as the practi-
cal effects of the legislation. 53
When analyzing a statute, courts apply a virtual per se rule of
invalidity to legislation whose form represents nothing more than
pure economic protectionism. 54 In Oregon Waste Systems v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality,55 the United States Supreme Court
defined the term "discriminatory" as economic protectionism
which displays "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the lat-
ter."56 The clearest example of such a discriminatory measure is
one that imposes an absolute prohibition or quota on the import or
export of a specific good.57
Similarly, the Supreme Court uses the per se rule of invalidity
for state regulations that tax imported goods.58 For example, in
legislation is a basically protectionist measure or whether it is "directed to legiti-
mate local concerns" is the "crucial inquiry." Id. at 624.
53. Id. The Court implied that it should examine legislative objectives to de-
termine whether the state regulation is a "patent discrimination against interstate
trade." Id.; Margaret Tortorella, Note, Will the Commerce Clause "Pull the Plug" on
Minnesota's Quantification of the Environmental Externalities of Electricity Production?, 79
MINN. L. REv., 1547, 1566 (1995) (citing City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626).
54. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 624 (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511
(1935); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1948); Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948)). See also Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (applying test in City of Philadelphia to conclude
that Alabama's proposed surcharge on hazardous waste from other states is facially
discriminatory); Chemical Waste Managment, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342
(1992) (applying per se rule of invalidity to act that charged additional fee for haz-
ardous waste imported from other states into Alabama).
55. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99.
56. Id.
57. Brief for Indiana as amicus curiae, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d
591 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1369) (quoting City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1979) and citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 337 (1979)). Thus,
the Court in City of Philadelphia invalidated the ban on imported solid waste be-
cause the statute's complete prohibition of imported waste constituted a simple
discriminatory, protectionist measure. City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 626-27.
Similarly, the Court in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), used the
same test to invalidate an Oklahoma statute which required that electric plants
burn a mixture of coal containing at least 10% Oklahoma-mined coal. In that
case, Wyoming showed that it had lost substantial severance taxes as a direct result
of the Oklahoma act. Id. at 444. The loss resulted because Wyoming had previ-
ously provided nearly one hundred percent of the coal purchased by Oklahoma
utility companies. Id. at 455. Though the Oklahoma utilities purchased only a
small percentage (3.4-7.4%) of their annual coal from Oklahoma sellers after the
Act was enacted, the court concluded that where discrimination exists, "neither
widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-
state competitors need be shown..." Id. at 456.
58. Brief for Indiana at 8, Alliance (No. 94-1369) (citing West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269
(1988); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)).
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West Lynn Creamery v. Healy,59 the Court applied the rule formulated
in City of Philadelphia to nullify a statute that provided for a tax on
imported milk when the tax was later rebated to local milk produ-
cers.60 The Healy Court stated that "tariffs against the products of
other States are so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal
not a single attempt by any State to enact one."61 Rather, such laws
are protective measures because they favor local, untaxed goods
over out-of-state taxed products and "are an unreasonable clog
upon the mobility of commerce."62
Finally, the Court has adopted the per se rule where a state pur-
ports to protect its citizens by requiring out-of-state businesses to
comply with measures that raise the cost of doing business in that.
state.63 Thus, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commis-
sion,64 the Supreme Court struck down a North Carolina statute
which required that only U.S. grades, and not those of individual
states, could appear on the packages of apples imported into the
state.65 The labeling requirement meant that apple growers across
the country would need to alter their packaging techniques if they
59. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
60. Id. at 2211.
61. Id. (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
Writing for the Court in Baldwin, Justice Cardozo stated that the power to tax
under such laws is "hostile in conception as well as burdensome in result." Id.
62. Id. See also Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 271 (holding regulation that ex-
empted locally-produced liquor from taxation invalid on basis that exemption was
discriminatory in favor of local products both in purpose and effect); New Energy,
486 U.S. at 272-73 (holding statute which denies credit for ethanol from states that
do not grant a refund, exemption, or tax credit to Ohio ethanol is "discriminating
against out-of-state ethanol producers to the advantage of in-state industry.").
63. Brief for Indiana as amicus curiae at 8, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1369) (citing Government Suppliers Consolidat-
ing Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279 (1992) (quoting Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Adver. Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977))). The rule applies in those
instances where such measures against out-of-state businesses are not also applica-
ble for in-state businesses. Id.
64. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
65. Id. at 354. In Hunt, North Carolina enacted a statute whereby all closed
imported containers of apples could bear no grade other than the U.S. grade or
standard. Id. at 335. This statute posed a difficult and potentially expensive mar-
keting dilemma for the Washington apple industry, for Washington growers would
have to change all of their packaging (40 million closed containers per year) in
order to comply with the North Carolina regulation. Id. at 337. Although the
North Carolina legislature enacted the statute to protect consumers from decep-
tive and confusing labeling, the regulation essentially limited Washington's ability
to compete in North Carolina by drastically raising the cost of doing business in
the state. Id. at 338. As a result, the Court concluded that the North Carolina
statute was discriminatory. Id. at 354.
14
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intended to export their goods into North Carolina.66 Additionally,
the Hunt Court stated that it would invalidate legislation that at-
tempted to protect state citizens if the state could have enacted a
less-burdensome regulation to achieve its objective. 67
By contrast, the Court will apply a balancing test to legislation
which does not discriminate, but rather promotes a legitimate local
concern. 68 This test, described in Pike v. Bruce Church,69 balances
the need for unburdened interstate commerce against the state's
protection of a legitimate local interest.70 The Pike Court stated
that "[w] here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a le-
gitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."
71
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co.72 held that it would not invalidate a non-discriminatory
statute merely because the statute causes some businesses to shift
from out-of-state industry to in-state industry.73 Rather, the Court
66. Id. at 338. The Court in Hunt found that each of the three methods that
could be used to alter packaging would be extremely burdensome on out-of-state
businesses. Id. at 349.
67. Id. at 354. ("[I]t appears that nondiscriminatory alternatives to the out-
right ban of Washington State grades are readily available.").
68. Tortorella, supra note 53, at 1566. Tortorella discusses the Supreme
Court's use of the balancing test in Commerce Clause challenges. Id.
69. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
70. Tortorella, supra note 53, at 1566-67. In Pike, the challenged statute re-
quired that cantaloupes be packaged in a certain way before they could be ex-
ported from Arizona. Pike, 397 U.S. at 139. The regulation's purpose was to
protect consumers from fraudulent packaging while enhancing the reputation of
Arizona cantaloupe growers. Id. at 143. A cantaloupe-growing business that pack-
aged its produce in California rather than in Arizona opposed the statute because
it claimed that the statute placed an undue burden on its business by requiring it
to build a packaging center in Arizona. Id. at 140.
71. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The Pike court determined that once a legitimate
local purpose is found, "the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of
the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities." Id. The Court found the regulation's purpose of enhanc-
ing the reputation of state cantaloupe growers to be a legitimate state interest. Id.
at 143. However, the court held that "the State's tenuous interest. . . cannot con,
stitutionallyjustify the requirement that the company build an unneeded $200,000
packing plant in the State." Id. at 145. Such a burden on commerce "has been
declared to be virtually per se illegal." Id. (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Johnson ,v.'
Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928)).
72. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
73. Id. at 474. In Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court considered legislation that
regulated the materials used to produce milk containers. Id. at 456.
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reasoned that an incidental burden on interstate commerce, in
light of local benefits, is not always indicative of a protectionist mea-
sure. 74 Only when the burden on interstate commerce outweighs
the statute's legitimate purposes will the regulation be held
unconstitutional. 75
3. Subsidies and the Market Participant Exception
A state's ability to subsidize local industry under the Com-
merce Clause raises additional concerns regarding the constitution-
ality of a state's legislation. Recent cases have held that a state may
choose to subsidize its local industries, without subsidizing foreign
businesses, as long as the subsidy does not take the form of a dis-
criminatory tax on out-of-state products. 76 Therefore, statutes that
provide for pure subsidies will generally withstand dormant Com-
merce Clause violation challenges.
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Coyp., 7 7 the Court introduced a
similar exemption to the dormant Commerce Clause termed the
"market participant exception." 78 Where the state itself participates
in an industry by contracting as a business entity, regulations that
support its business will be exempt from the dormant Commerce
74. Id. at 472 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
75. Id. Ordinarily, a facially-neutral economic regulation will survive a consti-
tutional challenge if the balancing test is applied because the court will give special
consideration to legitimate environmental interests. Tortorella, supra note 53, at
1568 (citing Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 474). But see Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437 (1992) (rejecting Oklahoma's environmental argument that requir-
ing in-state coal plants to burn 10% Oklahoma-mined coal would conserve Wyo-
ming's cleaner coal for future use).
76. Brief for Indiana as amicus curiae at 6, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1369) (citing New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988)). Consequently, the Court in West Lynn Creamery declared
that "[a] pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no bur-
den on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business." West Lynn Cream-
ery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2214 (1994). The Court found that a subsidy which is
funded out of taxes on the sale of milk to other producers is, however, violative of
the Commerce Clause. Id. Similarly, in New Energy, the Supreme Court found that
a subsidy which "explicitly deprives certain products of generally available benefi-
cial tax treatment" because they are produced out-of-state violates the Commerce
Clause even though a subsidy which offers reciprocity to out-of-state manufacturers
would be constitutional. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 274.
77. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
78. Id. at 810. For example, in Hughes the Court considered a Maryland statu-
tory scheme whereby the state, as a contracting party, paid bounties to Maryland
scrap processors if they presented an indemnity agreement from unlicensed hulk
automobile suppliers. Id. at 797. However, the regulation required out-of-state
processors to present much more documentation than Maryland processors before
they could qualify for a bounty. Id. at 801.
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Clause requirements.7 9 Courts, therefore, will likely defer to the
state legislature when a regulation is not discriminatory, but instead
furthers a legitimate environmental goal without burdening inter-
state commerce.80 However, lower courts have not developed a uni-
form application of the two tests to environmental regulations.8 1
III. ANALYSIS
A. Facts
Alliance for Clean Coal, whose members included western coal
companies and three coal-transporting railroads, brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
to challenge the constitutionality of the Illinois Coal Act.82 Alliance
claimed that the Coal Act discriminated against western coal produ-
cers both on its face and in its practical effect.83 Interestingly, Alli-
ance did not claim that it had lost any business as a result of the
79. Id. at 809-10. The Hughes Court held that a state's entrance into the mar-
ket to protect the environment did not violate the Commerce Clause. Id. See also
Bruce H. Aber, State Regulation of Out-of-State Garbage Subject to Dormant Commerce
Clause Review and the Market Participant Exception, 1 FoRHAM ENv'rL. L. REP. 99
(1989) (discussing state planning under market participant exception). Aber
notes that "[n]othing in the commerce clause prohibits a state, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and thereby favoring its
own citizens over others." Id. at 108. (citing Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810).
80. See Tortorella, supra note 53, at 1568 (discussing survival of environmental
regulations under balancing test) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449
U.S. 456, 474 (1981)).
81. Courts that have considered the validity of state regulations have applied
both the per se rule and the balancing test. See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 456
(applying balancing test); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir.
1995) (applying only per se rule); National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chi-
cago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995) (applying
balancing approach); Petricone, supra note 50, at 451-56 (discussing variances of
Court's rationale). Courts, even within the same circuit, have been ambiguous
about which test should generally be used for a statute which purports to protect
environmental issues. Compare Alliance, 44 F.3d at 591 with National Paint, 45 F.3d
at 1124. In National Paint, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a ban on spray paint and
jumbo indelible markers within the city of Chicago limits. National Pain4 45 F.3d
at 1124. The court found that the interest in protecting the city from vandalism
was legitimate and outweighed the burden on the spray paint companies who
would have to limit their sales to the suburbs. Id. at 1132.
82. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 555-56 (N.D. Ill. 1993),
affd, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995). Craig and
others were Commissioners of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Id. Alliance
based its constitutional challenge on the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. I .
83. Id. at 556. By making this claim, Alliance seemingly hoped that the court
would apply the virtual per se rule of invalidity adopted in City of Philadelphia. For a
full discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Philadelphia, see supra
notes 51-54, 57 and accompanying text.
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Coal Act's enactment.84 Further, Alliance conceded that its sales in
Illinois had increased despite the passage of the Coal Act.85
Both Alliance and the State of Illinois moved for summary
judgment.86 The district court granted Alliance's motion, 87 con-
cluding that the Coal Act clearly burdened interstate commerce
and also that its enactment did not seek to further a legitimate local
purpose. 88 Consequently, the Illinois Commerce Commission ap-
pealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, requesting dismissal of the case for want ofjurisdic-
84. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594.
85. Id. Alliance sought a declaratory judgment that the Coal Act violates the
Commerce Clause and requested an injunction which would prevent the enforce-
ment of the Coal Act and invalidate the environmental compliance plans thereun-
der. Craig, 840 F. Supp. at 555-56.
86. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern
when a motion for summary judgment will be granted. Rule 56(c) states:
[t] he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, dep-
ositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."
FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
87. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Craig, 840 F. Supp. 554, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(stating Illinois' and Alliance's motions), afftd, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995). In considering the motions for summary judgment, the
district court cited Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), which held that a
movant is entitled to summary judgment when he demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. at 557. The district court found that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and that "the only contested question in [the] case [was] whether the
coal act impermissibly restricts the free flow of interstate commerce." Craig, 840 F.
Supp. at 558.
88. Id. at 559-62. At trial, Alliance challenged two aspects of the Coal Act: the
requirement that the public utilities and commission take into account the need to
use Illinois coal in CAA compliance plans and the requirement of four of Illinois'
generating plants to include the installation of scrubbers in their compliance
plans. Id. At the circuit court level, Alliance cfiallenged other provisions of the
Coal Act. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1995).
As the district court noted, the Act "does not directly require Illinois public
utilities to use Illinois coal." Craig, 840 F. Supp. at 559. Furthermore, "the use of
Illinois coal is one factor to be considered along with the other goals and objec-
tives of the utilities act." Id. Yet, the court found that "[t]he requirement that
utilities and the commission base [C]lean [A]ir [A]ct compliance decisions-even in
part-on the interests of the Illinois coal industry is pure protectionism." Id. The
district court based its conclusion in part on the impossibility of determining the
basis of the decisional process of the utilities commission in its approval of a com-
pliance plan. Id. The district court, like the Seventh Circuit, failed to analyze the
facts of the case under the balancing test proposed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970). Id. at 561.
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tion, or in the alternative, reversal of the district court's
judgment.8 9
B. Narrative Analysis
1. Departure From the Traditional Test for Standing Under Article
III: Sustaining Alliance's Jurisdictional Claim
The Alliance court refused to require Alliance to demonstrate
that they had lost specific opportunities as a result of the Illinois
Coal Act's enactment.90 As a result, the Seventh Circuit found that
Alliance had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Coal
Act.91 Despite Alliance's failure to show specific instances of lost
opportunities, the court determined that Alliance had sustained the
jurisdictional challenge under Article 111.92 The court explained
that the particular, actual injury was not the missing evidence of lost
sales, but rather the western coal suppliers' inability to compete on
an equal footing with Illinois coal companies. 93
The court refused to accept Illinois' argument that Alliance
could not have suffered an injury in light of the increased sales of its
coal.94 Instead, the court concluded that the alleged injury was
based on the fact that Alliance's sales had not increased as rapidly
as they would have had western coal companies been able to com-
pete on an equal footing with their Illinois competitors. 95 Thus,
the majority in Alliance applied a relaxed standard in order to find
89. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594. The State's challenge to jurisdiction was not con-
sidered by the district court, but the Court of Appeals discussed this argument
because jurisdiction must be assessed before considering the merits of a case. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 595. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning for finding
that Alliance had standing to challenge the Coal Act under the dormant Com-
merce Clause, see infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
92. Id. Declaring that the showing of lost opportunities was "neither required
to establish standing nor reasonably expected under the circumstances of [the]
case," the Seventh Circuit held that Alliance had demonstrated an injury in fact
under the test in Lujan. Id. at 594. For a discussion of the test to determine injury
in fact as set forth in Lujan, see supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
93. Id. at 594 (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors v.Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)); Mapco v. Grunder, 470 F. Supp. 401, 403
(N.D. Ohio 1979)). Moreover, the court found, without citing to precedent, that
"it is unreasonable to expect Alliance to point to specific orders canceled or deals
reneged on," because supply arrangements with coal companies would not occur
until after the Illinois generating plants had submitted their compliance platns to
the commission. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594.
94. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595 (emphasis added).
95. Id. In addition, the court found it not unusual that the sale of western
coal had increased, because the 1990 Clean Air Act made the low-sulfur coal a
viable compliance option. Id. In the court's opinion, there was no plaintiff more
appropriate than Alliance to challenge the constitutionality of the Coal Act. Id.
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that Alliance had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
Coal Act under the dormant Commerce Clause. 96
Judge Cudahy, in a concurring opinion, found Alliance's
standing argument to be "elusive." 97 According to Judge Cudahy,
the best reason for allowing Alliance to challenge the Coal Act was
"that there will be no other plaintiffs with a basis for challenging
the Coal Act if the plaintiffs... are denied the right to proceed."98
Given the court's conclusion on the issue of standing, it should not
be surprising that its determination on the issue of the Coal Act's
constitutionality is equally curious.
2. Finding the Illinois Coal Act Void Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause
The Alliance court commenced its analysis of the Coal Act with
a brief outline of the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.99
The court declared that if a statute such as the Coal Act was nothing
more than a simple economic protectionist measure which discrim-
inated against interstate commerce on its face or in its effect, the
court would apply a per se rule of invalidity. 100 After stating its con-
clusions, the Seventh Circuit offered a more detailed examination
of Alliance in support of its decision. 10 1
At the outset, the court analogized the facts in Alliance to those
in West Lynn Creamery,'02 suggesting that the provisions of the Coal
(citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 461 (1992) (implying that Wyoming
did not have standing, but sellers of coal from Wyoming would)).
96. For a discussion of the relaxed standard the Seventh Circuit used to deter-
mine jurisdictional standing, see supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
97. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 597 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Judge Cudahy stated
that "[o] n the issue of standing, this is also a close case." Id.
98. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 597. Judge Cudahy noted that his stated reason in
itself would provide standing for Alliance to challenge the Coal Act. Id.
99. Id. at 595 (citing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Wyoming, 502
U.S. at 454). For a full discussion of the development and implications of the
dormant Commerce Clause, see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
100. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595 (citing DeHart v. Austin, 39 F.3d 718, 723 (7th
Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)). For a discus-
sion of the per se rule adopted in City of Philadelphia, see supra notes 51-54, 57 and
accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court declared that this recent Supreme Court case which inter-
prets the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is controlling. Id. The court
found that the Coal Act, like the milk-pricing order in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994), had the same effect as a tariff which is repugnant to
the unitary national economy that the Commerce Clause ensures. Alliance; 44 F.3d
at 595. For a discussion of West Lynn Creamery, see supra notes 59, 76 and accompa-
nying text.
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Act are comparable to a tax on out-of-state products.' 03 Continuing
its analysis, the Alliance court explained why the Illinois Coal Act is
nothing more than a protective measure.10 4 The court listed four
reasons why the Act is discriminatory on its face: 10 5 (1) the Coal Act
"tilts the overall playing field";10 6 (2) the Coal Act requires four
large electric-generating plants to install pollution control de-
vices; 10 7 (3) the Coal Act allows the generating plants to pass the
cost of the scrubbers on to consumers through their rate base; 108
and (4) the Coal Act requires the Commerce Commission to ap-
prove any proposed modification that would decrease the use of
Illinois coal by ten percent or more. 09 Based on these provisions,
the court determined that the purpose of Illinois' Coal Act was to
discriminate against low-sulfur western coal.' 10
The Seventh Circuit flatly rejected Illinois' argument that the
Coal Act does not discriminate against western coal, but merely en-
courages the use of local coal.I l Rather, the court viewed the Coal
Act as nothing more than an "ingenious" way to discriminate
against western coal, thus violating the Commerce Clause. 112 Fi-
Additionally, the court relied on Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). The Seventh Circuit implied that
the Coal Act is similar to the state surcharge on the disposal of solid waste that the
Court invalidated in Oregon Waste Systems as a violation of the Commerce Clause.
Id. For a discussion of Oregon Waste Systems, see supra notes 55-56 and accompany-
ing text.
103. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595. But see Brief for Indiana as amicus curiae at 9,
Alliance, (No. 94-1369) (arguing that Coal Act can be distinguished from tax on
goods produced out of state).
104. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595. The court reasoned that "[t]he Illinois coal Act
is a none-too-subtle attempt to prevent Illinois electric utilities from switching to
low-sulfur western coal as a Clean Air Act compliance option." Id.
105. Id. For a discussion of the provisions of the Illinois Coal Act, see supra
notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
106. Id. The court stated that the playing field is tilted because the Coal Act
requires the commissioners to take into account the potential effect on the local
coal industry. Id. See also 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1(a) (West 1995)
(describing requirement under Coal Act).
107. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595 (quoting 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §5/8-402.1).
See supra notes 28-29 for the textual language of this provision.
108. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595-96. Without citing to any authority, the court
concluded that using western coal is cheaper than installing scrubbers. Id.
109. Id. at 596. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-508 (describing require-
ments for proposed modifications).
110. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596. The court stated that "[t]he intended effect of
these provisions is to foreclose the use of low-sulfur western coal by Illinois utilities
as a means of complying with the Clean Air Act." Id. This, the court said, amounts
to discrimination. Id.
111. Id. Indeed, the court stated that this argument "rings hollow." Id.
112. Id. (citing West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2215 (1994)).
Because the Coal Act requires certain utility companies to install scrubbers, Illinois
1997] 279
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nally, the majority rejected the State's characterization of the pass-
through rates as a subsidy.113 Once again, comparing the provi-
sions of the Coal Act to the tariff in West Lynn Creamery, the court
stated that the fact that Illinois citizens will bear the cost of install-
ing scrubbers "does not cure the discriminatory impact on western
coal producers."1 14 In conclusion, the majority declared that "the
obvious intent [of the Illinois Coal Act] was to eliminate western
coal use by Illinois generating plants, thus effectively discriminating
against western coal."1 15 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit found
the Coal Act to be repugnant to the Commerce Clause and conse-
quently invalidated the statute.116
By contrast, Judge Cudahy's concurring opinion suggested that
a balancing test should replace the per se invalidity analysis for states
traditionally having plenary authority over local ratemaking and
electric operations problems. 117 According to Judge Cudahy, the
is in essence requiring that these generating plants burn high-sulfur Illinois coal.
Id. Thus, the Coal Act inhibits the viability of western coal. Id. The Alliance court
compared the Coal Act to the mandate in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437
(1992), which required Oklahoma utility companies to burn at least 10%
Oklahoma coal. Id. The Wyoming Court found that such a requirement violated
the dormant Commerce Clause. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 454. For a full discussion of
the Wyoming decision, see supra note 57.
113. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596.
114. Id. (citing West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2216-17). Distinguishing the
"agreement to subsidize" from the "market participant" exception, the Court in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), noted that the fact that
the Coal Act "has the purpose and effect of subsidizing the particular industry...
does not transform it into a form of state participation in the free market." Id.
(quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988)). Similarly, the
Court in New Energy held that a state tax credit for the use of Ohio ethanol violated
the Commerce Clause despite arguments that the tax fell under the "market par-
ticipant" exception. Id.
115. Id. at 596 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
116. Id. In his concurring opinionJudge Cudahy emphasized the dissimilari-
ties between the "subsidy equivalent" in the Coal Act and pure subsidies, like that
in Hughes, which do not run afoul of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 597 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring). In part, the pass-through rates may not qualify as a true subsidy be-
cause it is uncertain whether the guarantees benefit the utility companies and coal
industry. Id. (citing New Energy, 486 U.S. at 277; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263 (1984); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82
(1984)).
117. Id. at 597 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Although Judge Cudahy's opinion
did not use the balancing test formulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970), to formulate his conclusion, he considered the externalities that
Illinois has used as a basis for its regulation of coal. Id. at 597-98. The concurring
opinion's preference for the balancing test is also apparent from its recognition of
the several states' traditional plenary authority over electric operations. Id. at 598.
Indeed, Judge Cudahy stated that this premise is Illinois' strongest argument. Id.
Therefore, the concurring opinion's analysis of the "least cost" solutions came
closer to the balancing approach than the majority's examination.
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key question was whether the State arrived at a "least cost" solution
when it took into account the social costs that would result from the
loss of viability of Illinois coal.11 Additionally, Judge Cudahy noted
that a State should not recognize such social "externalities," be-
cause such a consideration "handicaps" interstate commerce. 119
C. Critical Analysis
1. Relaxing the Requirements for Standing to Challenge the
Constitutionality of a State Regulation
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Article III standing
issue is perplexing. In the words of concurring Judge Cudahy, "the
requisite showing of injury here is elusive."1 20 Courts have tradi-
tionally allowed parties to challenge state legislation by claiming
they are unable to compete on an equal footing in interstate com-
merce; however, courts faced with such challenges have not sug-
gested that standing would exist if the plaintiffs business actually
increased after the regulation's enactment. 21 Consequently, it is
counterintuitive to consider Alliance to be an injured party when
the sale of western coal in Illinois rose. 122 Therefore, the court's
118. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 598.
119. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992)), (con-
cluding allowance for these externalities is simply economic protectionism).
Judge Cudahy reasoned that a state may not consider social costs "since the
Commerce Clause effectively precludes consideration of local economic damage as
a legitimate reason to handicap interstate commerce." Id. However, he stated that
he believes no Supreme Court decision has gone so far as to suggest that a regula-
tion like the Coal Act violates the Commerce Clause, even though this conclusion
is the trend. Id. Additionally, the concurring opinion noted that the Coal Act
may not have the effect of discriminating against western coal at all, as the Illinois
generating plants are likely to choose Illinois coal over western coal regardless. Id.;
See also Tortorella, supra note 53, at 1561-64 (discussing impact of geographical
externalities on interstate commerce).
120. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
121. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jackson-
ville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (discussing requirements for Article III standing); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (same); Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 470
F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (same).
122. AlliancA 44 F.3d at 597 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (citing Appellant Reply
Brief at 3). This case is clearly distinguishable from other cases, such as Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), where standing to make a challenge under the
dormant Commerce Clause was sustained only after a showing of the regulation's
negative impact on the plaintiff's sale of goods in that state. Id. at 445 ("After...
the effective date of the Act, these utilities reduced their purchases of Wyoming
coal in favor of coal mined in Oklahoma.") The majority in Alliance stated that
even given the increased consumption of western coal since the Coal Act's enact-
ment, Alliance suffered an injury because the sale of their coal had not increased
as rapidly as it would have if it was enabled to compete on the same ground as
Illinois coal producers. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594.
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conclusion that Alliance's coal sales have risen at a slower rate due
to passage of the Coal Act is at best speculative. 25
Additionally, if the literal test for "injury in fact" had been ap-
plied to the facts of Alliance, the plaintiffs would have failed to
demonstrate standing.' 24 First, given Alliance's lack of proof con-
cerning lost sales and the resulting actual increase of sales since the
Coal Act's enactment, Alliance's injury was not "concrete and par-
ticularized," but merely "conjectural."125 Under the analysis estab-
lished in Northeastern Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville,12 6 the
"inability to compete on an equal footing" is enough to sustain a
claim of standing. 127 Given the fact that Alliance's sales actually in-
creased after the Coal Act's enactment, they fail to meet even this
threshold requirement. 128 Following this line of reasoning, Alli-
ance's injury cannot be considered "actual or imminent."1 29
Second, because they did not allege any particular injury, Alli-
ance fails to establish a causal connection between the Coal Act and
Alliance's inability to compete. 3 0 Even without considering the is-
sue of whether the court could compensate Alliance for its alleged
injury, Alliance failed to prove the first two prongs of the standing
test. 13' Alliance, therefore, has no standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the Illinois Coal Act.
2. Failure to Balance Competing Interests
As for its discussion of the Coal Act under the dormant Com-
merce Clause, the court failed to provide sufficient support for its
conclusion that this statute is an economic protectionist mea-
sure.13 2 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit inaccurately analogized
123. Alliance 44 F.3d at 594. The plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that
tended to show that their coal sales would have increased more rapidly had the
Coal Act not existed. See id. (evidencing lack of proof for Article III standing).
124. For a discussion of the test for Article III standing ("injury in fact"), see
supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
125. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594. For a discussion of the court's consideration of
the increased sales and injury for standing purposes, see supra notes 85 and 90-93
and accompanying text.
126. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v.Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656 (1993).
127. Id. at 664-68. See also Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 470 F. Supp. 401, 403-06
(N.D. Ohio 1979) (stating requirements for Article III standing).
128. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594 (stating sale of western coal is on rise "despite the
best efforts of the Illinois legislature").
129. Id. at 594.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note 20, at 741. Korobkin states that the
court's conclusion that the Coal Act is discriminatory on its face is not clear. Id.
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the Coal Act to other regulatory measures which have been found
to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 133 First, the Coal Act
does not absolutely prohibit, nor set a quota for the importation of
western coal.13 4 At most, the Coal Act requires utility companies to
submit proposed modifications to the Commission if they want to
reduce their use of Illinois coal by ten percent or more.135 The
Coal Act does not "require" the use of Illinois coal.13 6 Therefore,
the court should not have found the act to be facially discrimina-
tory based on this characterization.
Second, the Coal Act does not impose a discriminatory tax on
western coal. 137 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's comparison of the Coal
Act to the regulation involved in West Lynn Creamery was mis-
placed. 138 While the Coal Act may give Illinois coal companies an
advantage over western coal companies should the Commission deny a
request for modification, this effect is speculative.1 3 9 Rather, the provi-
sions of the Coal Act and their possible effect on the western coal
industry are not nearly as overtly protectionist as a tax or
surcharge. 14 Further, the court should not have invalidated the
For further discussion of the Seventh Circuit's failure to show how the Coal Act is
an economic protectionist measure, violative of the dormant Commerce Clause,
see infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's attempt to draw similarities be-
tween the Coal Act and other statutes, see supra notes 102-03, 114 and accompany-
ing text, and infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
134. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1 (West 1995). See also Brief for
Indiana as amicus curiae at 9, Alliance for Clean Coal v. Alliance, 44 F.3d 591 (7th
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1369) (arguing Coal Act does not create quota on amount of
western coal generating plants may use).
135. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-508 (requiring utility companies to sub-
mit proposals for modifications). For a full discussion of this provision, see supra
note 33 and accompanying text.
136. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-508; Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note
20, at 742. Korobkin notes that once plants install scrubbers under the Coal Act,
they are not explicitly required to burn Illinois coal. Id.
137. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1. See also Brief for Indiana as ami-
cus curiae at 9, Alliance (No. 94-1369) (arguing Coal Act is not discriminatory be-
cause it imposes no tax on western coal).
138. See Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595 (comparing Coal Act to protectionist meas-
ures in Oregon Waste Systems and West Lynn Creamery). See also Oregon Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (discussing prohibition of
state surcharge on disposal of out-of-state solid waste); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (holding milk-pricing order that taxed producers to
fund in-state subsidy violated dormant Commerce Clause).
139. 220 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-508. For a full discussion of this provi-
sion, see supra note 33.
140. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (discuss-
ing invalidity of state taxes on out-of-state goods); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (same); Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 93 (same).
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statute merely because some businesses shifted from out-of-state to
in-state as a result of the provision.141
Finally, the Coal Act does not facially or in its practical effect
raise Alliance's costs of doing business in Illinois. 142 This act is not
a measure of economic protectionism, rather, it is a plan which al-
lows Illinois coal companies to subsist while complying with the
CAA. 143 The court's analysis ignored Congress's intent that the in-
stallation of scrubbers be an acceptable means for complying with
the 1990 CAA Amendments. 144 The court's reasoning, therefore,
does not support its finding that the Coal Act is automatically void
under the virtual per se rule of invalidity.
As the concurring opinion in Alliance implies, the majority con-
cluded that the Coal Act is repugnant to the dormant Commerce
Clause without first giving due consideration to the State's legiti-
mate and important interests. 145 Because the Supreme Court has
been unclear on the issue of whether courts should apply the per se
rule or a balancing test in dormant Commerce Clause cases, the
Seventh Circuit's decision would have been more acceptable if the
court had applied both analyses. Moreover, the court might have
concluded differently had it applied the balancing test as the
United States Supreme Court did in Pike.14
141. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981). The Court in
Clover Leaf Creamery stated that the shifting of some business from out-of-state to in-
state suppliers is not absolutely indicative of a Commerce Clause violation. Id.
142. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595.
143. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1. For a discussion of the provi-
sions of the Coal Act which fulfill compliance requirements of the CAA, see supra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
144. Alliance 44 F.3d at 595. See also Korobkin, Sulfur Dioxide, supra note 25, at
369 (stating Amendments clearly anticipate state regulatory involvement in select-
ing compliance strategies and "Congress would have been explicit had it intended
to prohibit states from mandating.., specific technical solutions"); CAA §§ 415,
108, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651(n), 7408 (1995) (describing ways in which utility compa-
nies can comply with CAA). See supra note 22 for a discussion of the flexibility of
the CAA with regards to compliance options; supra notes 23-24 for a discussion of
the CAA's legislative history. See also, Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note 20, at 748.
This latter commentary suggests that had Congress wanted to prohibit such CAA
compliance plans as the Coal Act, which may affect out-of-state coal producers,
Congress would have exercised its power to preempt the plans itself. Id. Further-
more, the grant of power to Congress under the Commerce Clause "obviates any
need for the courts to protect" states' competing economic and environmental
interests proactively. Id.
145. Allianc 44 F.3d at 596.
146. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (finding
environmental benefits outweighed legislation's burden on interstate commerce);
Levy, supra note 46, at 635 (stating statute protecting environment is more favored
than one that protecting economic interests); Shields, supra note 46, at 292-93
(stating Supreme Court uses balancing test for examining environmental regula-
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If it had applied the balancing test, the Seventh Circuit would
have considered both the legitimate local interests and the burden
on interstate commerce. 147 Illinois' concern that its utility compa-
nies comply with the CAA is a legitimate environmental interest
which deserves far less scrutiny than pure economic regulations.
1 48
In addition, a state's interest in maximizing the financial return of
an industry within its borders is a legitimate interest.
149
These legitimate interests, however, must be weighed against
the burden the statute imposes on interstate commerce, and specif-
ically the burden on the western coal industry.'50 If the burden on
the industry is unwarranted, the regulation must fall.151 The bur-
den placed on Alliance by the Coal Act, however, is at most slight.
Alliance did not even allege any loss of business as a result of the
Coal Act, and any loss actually resulting from the modification pro-
visions is nonetheless negligible. 152 Illinois' substantial interest in
its coal industry and the industry's ability to comply with the CAA
outweighs the possible burdens on interstate commerce.' 53 Thus, if
tions); Tortorella, supra note 53, at 1568 (suggesting court would defer to legiti-
mate environmental goals if it applied balancing test).
147. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See also Shields,
supra note 46, at 293-94 (stating Court "uses judicially derived tests that balance
the state's interest in creating the state statute against the federal interest in un-
restricted commerce between the states" when considering constitutionality of en-
vironmental legislation).
148. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 457 (environmental benefits of
limiting importation of plastic milk containers outweighed burden on interstate
commerce). See also Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note 20, at 757 (concluding
state mandates for utility company compliance with CAA falls within exception to
dormant Commerce Clause violation). For a discussion of Illinois' legitimate inter-
ests, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
149. See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 457.
150. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
151. Id. (stating regulation must fall if nature of burden is more significant
than its purpose).
152. Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1995). Be-
cause the Coal Act at most causes Illinois' utility companies to change the amount
of western coal they purchase by a minimal amount (in order to comply with the
10% provision), Alliance's loss of revenue would be slight.
153. For a discussion of why the environmental issues outweigh any possible
burden on the western coal industry, see supra notes 49, 75, 80-81, 148 and infra
note 163. See also Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution:Judicial Activism, the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REv. 409, 441-53
(1992). McGinley argues that court decisions, such as City of Philadelphia, are sim-
ply wrong for holding that environmental regulations that have economic side ef-
fects are per se violative of the dormant Commerce Clause, as the primary concern
of such regulations is the environment and not economic protectionism. Id. See
also Petragnani, supra note 49, at 1251 (stating only time Court will strike down
state regulations is when it is facially discriminatory and application of balancing
test rarely results in invalidation of state regulations).
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the court had applied the balancing test, it might have upheld the
constitutionality of the Coal Act.
3. Lack of Consideration of the Market Participant Exception and
the Validity of a State Subsidy
Although the court was correct in its analysis of the Coal Act
under the market participant exception, the Seventh Circuit did
not apply the correct standard in its analysis of the Coal Act as a
state subsidy.'54 Indeed, the Coal Act cannot fall within the market
participant exception, because the state is not a purchaser of coal;
rather, it is a regulator of utility companies. 155 Consequently, the
Coal Act does not deserve protection under the exception
presented in Hughes.156
The court, however, rejected Illinois' argument that the rate-
base subsidy qualifies as an exemption to the dormant Commerce
Clause requirements without first giving adequate consideration to
the Supreme Court's discussion of such exemptions in West Lynn
Creamery.'57 The court once again compared the provisions of the
Coal Act to a tariff.158 As a result, the Alliance court concluded that
merely because Illinois' citizens would bear the cost of installing
scrubbers did not alter the discriminatory impact on western coal
producers. 159 The court's analysis fails in Alliance because the Coal
Act's subsidy is not a tax, and subsidies that do not tax foreign prod-
ucts will withstand a dormant Commerce Clause challenge even if
154. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596.
155. See id. (discussing state's role in regulating electric generating plants);
220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/8-402.1, 5/8-508 (West 1995) (setting forth state
of Illinois' regulations of utility companies). See also Korobkin, Local Politics, supra
note 20, at 747 (suggesting that seemingly inapposite results of applying market
participant and subsidy exceptions can be avoided by applying market participant
doctrine broadly).
156. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See also Alliance,
44 F.3d at 596 (comparing Coal Act to act in Hughes). For a discussion of Hughes
and the market participant exception, see supra notes 77-79 and accompanying
text.
157. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596. See also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114
S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (discussing subsidy exception under dormant Commerce
Clause challenges).
158. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596. The Alliance court stated that the Supreme
Court rejected the identical argument in West Lynn Creamey holding that "[t]he
cost of a tariff is also borne primarily by local consumers yet a tariff is the paradig-
matic Commerce Clause violation." Id. (emphasis added). For a full discussion of
the provisions distinguishing the Coal Act from a tariff, see supra notes 137-40 and
accompanying text.
159. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596.
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foreign businesses are not subsidized. 160 Therefore, even if the
Coal Act does not qualify for an exemption under the market par-
ticipant exception, it arguably qualifies for an exemption under the
subsidy exception.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Loss of a Valuable State Industry and the Demise of
State Sovereignty
The potential impact of the Seventh Circuit's decision is dis-
turbing. Because the court held that the Coal Act violated the
Commerce Clause, Illinois must now promulgate an alternative
CAA compliance plan.161 Additionally, the court's disapproval of
the pollution control device requirements essentially leaves Illinois
with one less alternative for complying with the CAA. 162 This result
suggests that the Seventh Circuit places a higher importance on in-
terstate economic concerns than on the national environment. 163
As a result of the Seventh Circuit's holding, Illinois' utility com-
panies will probably incur higher costs in complying with EPA's reg-
ulations than they would have under the Coal Act. 164 It is likely that
the utility companies will have no choice but to use low-sulfur west-
160. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-402.1 (describing provisions of Coal
Act). See also West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2205 (discussing subsidy exemption
to dormant Commerce Clause requirements); Korobkin, Sulfur Dioxide, supra note
25, at 397. Korobkin analogizes Illinois' mandate of scrubber installation to a state
subsidy. Id. He argues that when a state regulates a utility, "all meaningful distinc-
tion between state spending and state regulation disintegrates, which is why the
Illinois requirement that certain utilities install scrubbers so that they can continue
to burn local coal looks precisely like a scrubber subsidy." Id. See also Patterson,
supra note 48, at 1025-26 (arguing courts should not strike down pure state-created
subsidies).
161. See Alliance, 44 F.3d at 596. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Alliance
strips the state of Illinois of one of its alternatives for compliance under the CAA.
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the CAA's require-
ment for states to formulate compliance plans.
162. For a discussion of the ways in which states could comply with EPA's
regulations, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
163. See Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note 20, at 758. Korobkin states that
current court interpretations of dormant Commerce Clause issues prevent public
decision-making on compliance plans for the CAA's acid rain amendments. Id.
See also McGinley, supra note 153, at 447 (stating courts' invalidation of state meas-
ures which seek primarily to protect quality of environment is erroneous).
164. Because the utility companies were able to pass the cost of the scrubbers
onto their ratepayers, they would have incurred little expense. Presently, Illinois
utility companies must either install scrubbers at their own expense or use low-
sulfur western coal, which tends to be more expensive than Illinois coal.
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ern coal to meet CAA standards.165 As a result, Illinois' coal indus-
try is in jeopardy of facing a rapid decline in its viability. 166
The impact of the Seventh Circuit's decision on state sover-
eignty is of additional concern. Although regulation of in-state util-
ity companies has traditionally been a legitimate state concern, the
court's holding implies that states no longer have the regulatory
power they once enjoyed. 167 The court's opinion suggests that even
legitimate state interests will be held to a stricter standard under
the dormant Commerce Clause. 168 Thus, the court's holding not
only serves to usurp the state's power, but also displaces the tradi-
tional analyses of the issues as well.' 69
B. Lowering the Standing Standard and Leaving No Clear
Dormant Commerce Clause Standard to Follow
The court's decision establishes a lesser standard for demon-
strating standing under Article III of the Constitution. By disre-
garding the relevant factual situation in Alliance and the traditional
basis for proving an injury in fact, the Seventh Circuit implies that
even those parties who cannot show they suffered an actual injury
will have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute
under the dormant Commerce Clause.170
Finally, the Alliance court's decision offers no clear guidance
for future courts faced with dormant Commerce Clause claims. By
165. See Alliance, 44 F.3d at 593 (stating installing scrubbers to use high-sulfur
is more expensive than using low-sulfur western coal). If the generating plants are
to subsist at all, they will have no choice but to use the western coal.
166. See Korobkin, Local Politics, supra note 20, at 697 (discussing effects of
CAA Amendments on viability of high-sulfur coal). For a discussion of the Amend-
ments and their impact on midwestern coal industry, see supra notes 23 and 25 and
accompanying text.
167. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 598 (Cudahy, J., concurring). States traditionally
have held the power to regulate the utility companies located within its borders.
Id. See also Korobkin, Sulfur Dioxide, supra note 25, at 397 (arguing that when state
requires specific method for complying with CAA, it acts as functional market par-
ticipant); McGinley, supra note 153, at 423-30 (stating Tenth Amendment affords
protection of state sovereignty).
168. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 591. The court in Alliance suggests that the states no
longer enjoy plenary power to regulate their own utility companies, thus altering
the entire standard by which these regulations are judged. Id.
169. Id. at 597. Even where the state has ultimate control over the regulation
of its utility companies, its use of this power has to be balanced against the burdens
of interstate commerce. Id. However, the majority fails to consider the state's
traditional power at all and replaces the traditional balancing test with the strict
scrutiny test. Id. at 596. See also Petragnani, supra note 49, at 1216 (arguing judici-
ary should not usurp power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
170. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 594. For a full discussion of the issue of standing in
Alliance, see supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
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disregarding the balancing test, the court fails to explain what
should be the appropriate analysis of such claims.1 71 Consequently,
the court's holding does little more than demonstrate the Seventh
Circuit's ambiguous and undecided position on the relationship be-
tween state legislation and the dormant Commerce Clause.1 72
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Alliance is both discouraging
and ineffective.
V. CONCLUSION
In Alliance, the Seventh Circuit relaxed the standard used to
demonstrate standing to make a constitutional challenge. More im-
portantly, the court incorrectly reviewed the Coal Act under a strict
standard without giving due consideration to the State's legitimate
interests. The court's inaccurate comparison of the Coal Act to
protectionist measures gives little guidance to state legislatures who,
like Illinois, attempt to comply with federal regulations. The Alli-
ance court's failure to recognize Illinois' interests hinders the state's
ability to regulate the environmental resources within its borders.
Likewise, the court's decision suggests that state autonomy will be
sacrificed under the dormant Commerce Clause even where the
state purports to further important environmental goals. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit's judgment neglects modem environmental and in-
dustrial concerns and serves only to restrict state sovereignty.
Jennifer A. Irrgang
171. Alliance, 44 F.3d at 595. For a discussion of how the court erred by not
analyzing the Coal Act under the balancing test, see supra notes 145-53 and accom-
panying text.
172. In National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995), the Seventh Circuit applied both tests to
determine the constitutionality of a statute which banned spray paint from being
sold within Chicago's city limits. Id. For a full discussion of the court's analysis in
National Paint, see supra note 81.
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